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Abstract
We examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, which
are strategically equivalent under standard preferences. We investigate whether
the empirical breakdown of this equivalence is due to (non-standard) preferences or
due to the different complexity of the two formats (i.e., a different level of math-
ematical/individual sophistication needed to derive the optimal bidding strategy).
We first elicit measures of individual preferences and then manipulate the degree
of complexity by offering various levels of decision support. Our results show that
the equivalence of the two auction formats only breaks down in the absence of de-
cision support. This indicates that the empirical breakdown is caused by differing
complexity between the two formats rather than non-standard preferences.
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1 Introduction
The first-price sealed-bid auction (FSPBA) and the Dutch auction (DA) are two of the most
frequently used auction formats. In an FPSBA, bidders simultaneously submit “sealed” bids
to the seller and the highest bidder receives the object and pays his bid. In a DA, the seller
starts at a high initial ask price and gradually decreases the ask price until the first bidder
stops the auction, receives the item, and pays the stop price. With slight variations, both
the FPSBA and the DA generate billions of dollars in revenue each year. Governments and
private firms frequently use the FPSBA for procurement in construction and to subcontract
with suppliers. Federal banks and firms use variants of the DA to sell securities and refinance
credit.1 Furthermore, the DA can be found on fish and fresh-produce markets (e.g., Cassady,
1967).
With regard to the actual implementation of auctions, oﬄine auctions as a mechanism to buy
and sell goods is not a new phenomenon, but the specific use of online auctions has experienced
tremendous growth in the new media era (Hennig-Thurau et al., 2010).2 According to Ariely
and Simonson (2003), the popularity of online auctions is due to the following three particular
features: First, online auctions overcome geographical limitations, such that people from all over
the world have the opportunity to submit their bids in any auction. Second, electronic auctions
on the Internet allow for more flexibility among sellers and bidders, because the duration of
an auction can be several days (or even weeks), and there is the possibility of asynchronous
bidding. Third, auctions can be organized at substantially lower costs, which translates into
lower commission fees and hence higher participation rates among sellers and buyers.
The increase in the use of Internet-based auctions has led to a rise in the demand for expert
services. Indeed, there is an increasing number of consulting firms specializing in auctions
(e.g., Market Design Inc.) and major economic consulting companies offer services regarding
auctions and bidding (e.g., The Brattle Group, NERA). These services typically include all
aspects relevant for setting up and participating in auctions (e.g., bid tracking, bidding strategy,
auction rules and design, training, provision of input to regulators). Moreover, the design of
decision support systems (DSS) has also attracted considerable interest. For example, several
1Note, however, that these examples typically auction off multiple units and that the auctions are then
modified such that they usually do not discriminate between different bidders but apply a uniform-pricing
rule.
2See also Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc (2009), who provide an overview of the implications of
economically relevant aspects that are characteristic of Internet auctions.
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patents have been filed for (automated) bid-advising systems that account for, e.g., the auction
structure and risk attitudes of rival bidders based on historical data.3 At the same time,
technological advances and the use of Internet auctions means that relevant information can be
provided more easily and faster in the course of an online auction. We take these observations
as a starting point to address the implications of decision support systems in different formats
of (online) auctions.4
Theory suggests that the FPSBA and the DA yield the same revenue as both formats
are strategically equivalent. However, this strong theoretical result breaks down empirically.
Previous research suggests three possible explanations: opportunity costs (Carare and Rothkopf,
2005; Katok and Kwasnica, 2007), preferences (Weber, 1982; Nakajima, 2011; Lange and Ratan,
2010; Belica and Ehrhart, 2013; Ehrhart and Ott, 2014), and complexity of the decision (Cox
et al., 1983). We analyze the role of preferences and complexity while controlling for opportunity
costs. Our results indicate that the non-equivalence is driven by the difference in complexity
of competitive bidding in the two auction formats rather than by individual (non-standard)
preferences.
The empirical breakdown of this equivalence is a robust observation in experimental settings
both in the laboratory and in the field. However, the direction of the deviation is non-conclusive.
On the one hand, Coppinger et al. (1980) and Cox et al. (1982) find that the FPSBA yields
higher revenue than the DA in a controlled laboratory setting. On the other hand, in a field
experiment on an Internet auction platform, Lucking-Reiley (1999) finds that the DA generates
higher revenue than the FPSBA.
Differences in opportunity costs can explain these differences. In a DA, bidders have an
incentive to accept a high price and stop the auction early, because they have to frequently
monitor the price clock or even have to physically return to the auction site to check for updates
in prices as long as the auction is running. Such costs do not occur in the (static) FPSBA which
ends immediately after the (simultaneous) submission of bids.
Carare and Rothkopf (2005) show theoretically that such increased opportunity costs in-
crease the optimal bid. In a DA, Cox et al. (1983) and Katok and Kwasnica (2007) analyze
the trade-off between opportunity costs and additional utility from suspense, i.e., from a joy of
3See, for example, Guler et al. (2002, 2003, 2009); Zhang and Guler (2013).
4Adomavicius et al. (2013) and Bichler et al. (2017) who analyze the role of decision support systems
in combinatorial auctions.
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gambling. Both articles provide evidence that increasing opportunity costs by increasing pay-
offs or by decreasing the clock speed, respectively, increases bids in a DA. In contrast to their
approach, our goal is to assess the predictive power of different preference-based theories for
observed bidding and to analyze the effect of complexity. Hence, we eliminate confounding dif-
ferences in opportunity costs by holding the time per auction format and thus the opportunity
costs from participation constant. In addition, we hold the action set, i.e., the set of feasible
bids, constant across the two formats which allows a direct comparison of the two auctions.
In the absence of opportunity costs, the strategic-equivalence result rests on the assumption
that bidders have standard preferences, i.e., they derive utility only from realized personal
payoffs. In addition, the utility function is global in the sense that the effect of wealth changes
does not depend on whether such changes occur in the gain or loss domain or whether they are
certain or generated by a lottery. With regard to the departures from standard preferences,
we study expectations-based reference-dependent and Allais-type preferences. We focus on
these two specifications, because they are frequently used to explain decision making under
uncertainty.5
Under reference dependence, the bidder compares gains and losses in wealth relative to a
reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In this comparison, the bidder is assumed to be
loss averse and puts more weight on negative deviations from this reference point (losses) than
on equivalent positive deviations (gains). Loss aversion contradicts the global-utility assumption
of standard preferences because the bidder considers changes in wealth with respect to a local
reference point. The specification of the reference point is subject to debate. Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006, KR) propose expectations-based reference dependence, i.e., the reference point is
stochastic and given by the rational expectations that the individual holds over the outcomes
of a risky decision. In the following, we will denote expectations-based reference-dependent
preferences as KR preferences.
Individuals with Allais-type (AT) preferences prefer outcomes that are generated with cer-
tainty to the same outcomes that are generated by a risky lottery (e.g., Andreoni and Sprenger,
2010). This difference is most prevalent in the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953). Here, subjects
prefer a degenerate lottery over a risky one with a higher expected value but reverse their choice
5Reference dependence as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is the most cited theory on
risky decision making (Kim et al., 2006). Allais-type preferences are an early critique of expected utility
theory (EUT) (Allais, 1953) and are empirically very robust in explaining deviations from predictions
under standard preferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Camerer, 1989; Weber, 2007).
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if both lotteries are monotonically transformed and become both risky (the so-called common-
ratio effect, CRE). This reversal is inconsistent with standard preferences as it violates the
crucial independence axiom of EUT (Savage, 1954; Anscombe and Aumann, 1963). According
to this axiom, decisions between lotteries should not depend on consequences that do not differ
between the lotteries.
We make use of data from a two-stage experiment in which we first elicit the preferences of
all subjects that participate in our experiment. In this first stage, we utilize the procedure of
Abdellaoui et al. (2007) and elicit individual preferences in a fully non-parametric procedure,
i.e., without imposing any assumption on the functional form of utility. Furthermore we measure
to what extent participants exhibit Allais-type preferences by utilizing a metric version of the
CRE (e.g., Beattie and Loomes, 1997; Dean and Ortoleva, 2014; Schmidt and Seidl, 2014).
Preference theories assume Bayesian rationality in the sense that bidders derive and process
probabilities correctly. However, bidding in auctions can be a demanding problem. In deriving
the optimal bid, the bidder faces a trade-off between increasing his winning probability by
submitting a higher bid and increasing his winning profit by submitting a lower bid. Individual
preferences determine the optimal bid that balances these diametric effects. However, this
optimization requires a certain level of mathematical sophistication. It is thus possible that
the observed differences between bidding behavior is due to different levels of complexity of the
two auction formats. In other words, bidders can make mistakes, e.g., in deriving the winning
probability associated with their bid, and these mistakes might differ between the two formats.
We design a DSS to reduce the complexity and assist bidders in deriving the optimal bid
that corresponds to their individual preferences. We vary the auction format within-subjects
and the level of decision support between-subjects. Subjects either have no decision support
(No DSS treatment) or they have medium (Medium DSS treatment) or full support (Full DSS
treatment) to assist bidding. The decision support system is a computerized overlay displaying
additional information. Medium DSS shows the winning probability whereas Full DSS addi-
tionally provides expected profits. Although this information is redundant for fully rational
decision makers, it is non-trivial to derive and providing such information greatly reduces the
complexity of optimal bidding.6
6Our implementation of decision support is primarily a mean to analyze the role of complexity in
competitive bidding, the design of such DSS is also of interest in itself. Several patents have been filed
for (automated) bid-advising systems that account for, e.g., the auction structure and risk attitudes of
rival bidders based on historical data (see, e.g., Guler et al., 2002, 2003, 2009; Zhang and Guler, 2013).
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Our results highlight the role of decision support systems. In line with the literature,
we find significant differences between auction formats when bidders do not receive decision
support. However, differences vanish between participants once we provide decision support.
This indicates that the observed differences in bidding behavior between the FPSBA and the DA
are due to different levels of complexity rather than non-standard preferences. In addition, our
tests show that bidding behavior strongly depends on participants’ risk aversion. The influence
of individual loss aversion and Allais-type preferences is not significant and cannot explain
differences in bidding behavior. Our results thus highlight that from a consulting perspective,
it seems to be more important to support decision makers in the derivation of optimal bidding
strategies than to focus on the choice of the auction format.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the model environment and
theoretically analyzes the effect of different preference specifications on optimal bidding in the
FPSBA and the DA. Section 3 presents our experimental design and our implementation of
decision support. We report our results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
In this section, we first describe the two auction mechanisms. We then characterize the equilibria
in both auction formats for standard preferences (SP), Ko¨szegi-Rabin (KR) preferences, and
Allais-type (AT) preferences. We analyze the optimal bidding behavior of one bidder given a
bidding strategy of the competitor.
In both auction formats, two bidders compete for one indivisible item and the highest bidder
wins. Let P = {p1, . . . , pn} be a discrete price grid. In the FPSBA, each bidder places a bid
b ∈ P at which he is willing to buy the item. In the DA, each bidder decides for every ask a ∈ P
whether to accept it or not. In the FPSBA, the price corresponds to the highest bid, whereas
in the DA, it corresponds to the highest accepted ask. The winning bidder receives the item
and pays the price. If the bidder does not win the auction, he does not receive the item and
does not pay anything.7 In both auction formats bidders face a trade-off between improving
their probability of winning and increasing their profit in case of winning.
Our DSS implementation resembles such automated bidding advice that estimates competitors’ bidding
behavior in a given auction format.
7Ties are broken at random with equal probability to receive the item.
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To derive the equilibrium bidding strategy in the discrete FPSBA, we follow Cai et al.
(2010). For the dynamic course of the DA, we adopt the modeling approach of Bose and Daripa
(2009). In the DA, the seller starts the auction with the highest ask pn. She then approaches
each bidder sequentially asking whether or not the bidder accepts that ask. Which bidder is
asked first is randomly determined at the beginning of each offer. Each bidder has the same
chance to be asked first. In case that the bidder who is asked first rejects the offer, the seller
offers the same ask to the other bidder.
2.1 Standard preferences
The term standard preferences covers all preferences that are purely outcome-based and only
consider the own payoff. This means an individual has standard preferences if the utility function
is global and only depends on one’s own payoff (DellaVigna, 2009).
Proposition 1 (Standard Preferences). The FPSBA and the DA are strategically equivalent,
which implies that they yield the same revenue (Vickrey, 1961).
The crucial observation to this result is that the information revealed during the descending
of the price clock in the DA does not change the trade-off between a bidder’s winning probability
and his profit in case of winning. Suppose a bidder bids b = pk in an FPSBA. This bidder enters
a DA with the plan to accept the ask a = pk, because the ex-ante problem is identical for the two
formats. As the price clock is approaching pk, two things may happen. First, the competitor
accepts an ask greater than pk. In this case, the auction ends and the bidder cannot react to
this information. Second, the price continues to fall which increases the probability to win.
However, the marginal trade-off stays the same. This is due to the fact that a bidder derives
his optimal bidding strategy under the assumption that he has the highest valuation. Hence,
the bidder sticks to his plan and waits for the ask pk.
2.2 Expectations-based reference points
In contrast to individuals with standard preferences, an individual with reference-dependent
preferences does not only care about his absolute payoff, but also compares the outcome to a
reference point. Therefore, the utility function of such a bidder consists of two parts. First, the
term u(x) corresponds to utility derived from payoff x as under standard preferences. Second,
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the term n(x, r) corresponds to gain-loss utility that evaluates the outcome x against a reference
level r (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Following the approach of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)
the gain-loss utility is defined piece-wise as
n(x, r) = µ (u(x)− u(r)) ,
where
µ(z) :=

ηz if z > 0
ηλz if z ≤ 0.
Here η > 0 determines how important the relative component is compared to the absolute
payoff. Furthermore, λ represents the level of loss aversion which weighs negative deviation
from the reference point (losses) relative to positive deviations (gains). If λ > 1, the bidder is
loss averse, i.e., losses hurt him more than equally sized gains please him. If λ = 1, the agent
is loss-neutral, and if λ < 1, the agent is gain-seeking. Total utility is the sum of both parts
and given by uKR(x, r) = u(x) + n(x, r). We follow the literature and focus on the effect of loss
aversion by assuming that utility of payoff u(x) is linear. Hence, gain-loss utility n(x, r) is a
two-piece linear function.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) assume that the reference point is stochastic and formed by
the rational expectations of the bidder. They introduce the concept of a personal equilibrium
which requires that the bidder has rational expectations about his own behavior and behaves
consistently with his plans. Specifically, they propose that the bidder evaluates each possible
outcome x under the winning probability Pr(x|b) against all other possible outcomes under
this distribution. This modification has recently been successful in describing various empirical
observations from laboratory endowment effects to labor supply in the field (e.g., Sprenger,
2010; Ericson and Fuster, 2011; Crawford and Meng, 2011).
Proposition 2 (Expectations-based reference point). A revenue ranking of the FPSBA and
the Dutch auction is not possible.
In the FPSBA, loss aversion implies that bidders want to reduce the difference between
the payoff in case of winning and in case of losing the auction. As a consequence, subjects
with a higher degree of loss aversion place higher bids than less loss-averse subjects. In the
FPSBA, there exists an almost everywhere unique optimal bidding strategy (Eisenhuth and
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Ewers, 2012).
In contrast to the FPSBA, there might be several consistent bidding strategies in the DA.
For example, it may be optimal for a subject to accept a high offer p if it planned to do so,
whereas it is optimal for the same subject to wait for a smaller offer p′ if her initial plan was
to accept only a small offer p′. Different plans induce different reference points and thereby
different optimal bidding strategies. Since several reasonable reference points can exist in the
DA, we do not get a unique bidding prediction but a set of optimal bidding strategies. Applying
a refinement and identifying the bidding strategy with the highest expected utility might not
be possible as the optimality of a bidding strategy can change during the dynamic course of the
auction (Ehrhart and Ott, 2014).
As shown in the Appendix A.2.3, it may well be the case that for a given valuation the
lowest optimal bid in the DA is lower than the optimal bid in the FPA, whereas the highest
optimal bid in the DA is higher than the optimal bid in the FPA. As a consequence, a revenue
ranking is not possible in general.
2.3 Allais-type preferences
Allais-type preferences violate the independence (or substitution) axiom, which is essential for
EUT (Allais, 1953; Savage, 1954; Anscombe and Aumann, 1963). The independence axiom
states that an individual who is indifferent between two lotteries should also be indifferent
between these lotteries if the probabilities of both lotteries are multiplied by ρ ∈ (0, 1]. That is,
if one scales the probabilities of both lotteries by a common ratio, the preference ordering is not
affected under EUT. Grimm and Schmidt (2000) show that this independence requirement is a
necessary and sufficient condition for strategic equivalence between the FPSBA and the DA.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) report that subjects have a preference for certainty, i.e.,
outcomes in a degenerate lottery. In their experiment, a majority of individuals reveals that
they prefer a degenerate lottery over a risky one but reverse this choice if both lotteries are
scaled by ρ such that both now become risky. Thus, participants violate the independence
requirement. This so-called “Allais paradox” (Allais, 1953) is empirically very robust, although
reverse Allais-type preferences (i.e., a preference for risky outcomes if a certain outcome is
available) have also been observed experimentally (Camerer, 1989; Weber, 2007).
Proposition 3 (Allais-type preferences). The DA yields higher revenue than the FPSBA if
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bidders have Allais-type preferences. The FPSBA generates higher revenue if bidders have
reverse Allais-type preferences (Weber, 1982; Nakajima, 2011).
The intuition is that the current price in the DA is augmented by a psychological premium
for certainty for individuals with Allais-type preferences. This premium makes it more attractive
to accept a high price in the DA than in the FPSBA in which all bids imply uncertainty. In
other words, the DA offers a certain payoff in the given round against a risky lottery (prices in
future rounds), whereas the FPSBA only offers a risky lottery.8
3 Experiment
In this section, we first introduce our experimental design and then review previous research
that examines the equivalence of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the Dutch auction ex-
perimentally.
3.1 Design
Each subject participated in 18 FPSBA and 18 DA. Each auction consists of one participant
and one bidding robot as bidders. The valuations of the participant are drawn from the set
{6, 10, 14, 18, 22, 26, 30, 34, 38} EUR. In each format, every participant is assigned each valuation
twice in order to make participants’ bidding behavior as comparable as possible. The bidding
robot draws one price from P = {0, 1, . . . , 21} EUR according to a uniform distribution. This
realization is the robot’s bid in the FPSBA and its stopping price in the DA. We use a bidding
robot as the competitor for three reasons. First, we do not want our results to be confounded by
other-regarding preferences that are not considered in any of the models presented in Section
2. Second, we effectively reduce the strategic problem to a decision problem by fixing the
strategy of the competitor. This makes it easier for subjects to focus on their optimal strategy
by breaking the dynamics of higher-order beliefs.9 Third, we are able to precisely calculate the
8We note that this overbidding only works given our organization of the DA, because we resolve the
order in which the seller approaches the two bidders at the beginning of each period. If we had broken
ties at random after each round, which is frequently done in DA implementations, the current price
would actually be risky as well and Allais-type preferences would coincide with standard preferences.
9Note that most work that analyzes strategic interaction in auctions assumes that subjects’ preferences
are common knowledge and that only valuations are private information. However, one cannot ensure
common knowledge in reality.
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winning probability and the expected profit. The provision of this information depends on the
DSS treatment status.
Auction formats
In our experiment, we analyze the following two auction formats:
• FPSBA In the FPSBA, the computer screen informs the participants about their valu-
ation and features a testing area. In this area, participants can explore the consequences
of a particular bid on their profit and, depending on the DSS treatment, on the winning
probability and the expected profit (see below). Participants are further informed about
the remaining time of the current round. Finally, they enter their actual bid and submit
this bid by pressing a button. After submitting their bid, participants are immediately
informed whether they have won the auction and about the remaining time the current
auction lasts. When the round has timed out, a feedback screen informs the subjects
about their valuations, the winning bid, whether or not they received the item, and their
profit for the this round.
• DA In the DA, the computer screen informs participants about their valuation and dis-
plays the current price, the time until the next price, and the next price. As in the FPSBA,
participants are informed about their profit given both the current and the next price.
Depending on the DSS treatment, participants are also informed about the probability to
be offered the current price and the next price as well as the associated expected profits
(see below). Finally, participants can accept the current price by pressing a button. After
either the participant or the computer bidder has accepted the current price, participants
are immediately informed whether they have won the auction and about the remaining
time the current auction lasts. When the round has timed out, participants receive the
same feedback as in the FPSBA.
Decision support system
The theoretical analysis on the role of preferences in Section 2 highlights the fact that deriving
the optimal bid depends on the following aspects: (i) the profit from winning with the chosen
bid, vi − bi, (ii) the probability to win with the chosen bid, Pr (win|bi), and (iii) the expected
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utility derived from the combination of the former two. The latter depends on the individual
preferences whereas the former two are identical across all theories. Hence, we design a DSS
that assists the bidder by providing (i) the profit from winning, (ii) the winning probability,
and (iii) the expected profit which is the product of (i) and (ii).
Any deviation from bidding predictions can result from two sources: an omitted preference
specification or problems in deriving the optimal bid. Our DSS allows us to disentangle the role
of preferences from the impact of a lack of mathematical sophistication (complexity). This is
because in the experiment, we fix the bidding strategy of the competitor and hence reduce the
strategic problem of finding mutual best responses to the problem of finding a one-sided best
response (i.e., an optimization or decision problem). We can thus objectively state expected
profits and winning probabilities that should help participants derive the bid that maximizes the
expected utility based on their actual preference specification. In other words, we implement the
DSS to analyze whether observed bids are due to the underlying preferences or the complexity
of the auction.
Specifically, the DSS varies between participants regarding the information a bidder receives
during an auction. There are three nested levels of DSS: No, Medium, and Full DSS. In the
FPSBA, the information is given for the current test bid. In the DA, the information is given
for both the current and the next price. We vary the information content of the DSS between
participants. The information content in each condition is as follows:
• No DSS In the FPSBA, subjects see the profit if bid is successful which is the profit
their test bid would generate given that they won the auction. In the DA, subjects see
the profit at given price which is the profit they would make if they accept the current
price or if they now decide to accept the next price.
• Medium DSS Subjects have the same information as in No DSS. In addition, in the
FPSBA, they also see the winning probability of their test bid which is the probability
of having a higher bid than the competitor plus the probability of having the same bid
and being selected as winner by the tie-breaking rule. In the DA, subjects receive the
probability to be offered the given price for both the current and the next price. The
probability to receive the current price pk is trivially given by 1. However, the probability
to be offered the next ask, H ik, is highly non-trivial to derive (see Section A.2.2 for details).
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• Full DSS Subjects have the same information as in Medium DSS. In addition, in the
FPSBA, they also see the expected profit of their test bid. In the DA, subjects see the
expected profit of the next price. In the FPSBA, the expected profit is the product of
the winning probability and the profit if the bid is successful. In the DA, the expected
profit is the product of the probability to be offered the given price and the profit at the
given price.
We are not aware of any other work that incorporates decision support in auctions. Ar-
mantier and Treich (2009) elicit both subjective probabilities and risk preferences in an attempt
to find an explanation for overbidding in experimental first-price auctions. The authors report
that participants underestimate their winning probability and overbid. Furthermore, they in-
vestigate the effect of a feedback system regarding winning probabilities. The feedback is
implemented as follows. Participants are asked to predict their winning probability and they
are given feedback regarding the precision of their prediction at the end of each round. As
such, their feedback system is designed to induce learning whereas learning is not necessary in
our setup as participants are given support before (FPSBA) or during (DA) the auction. They
show that overbidding is reduced if their feedback system is in place.
Subjects
Table 1 provides an overview of participants characteristics in the different treatments.
Risk aversion is measured as the are under the curve on the gain domain, i.e. the integral
of the estimated utility function on the gain domain. We normalize the domain of utility to
[0,1] by dividing each elicited gain by the maximum gain. We interpolate linearly between the
elicited points and use a geometric approach to calculate the area. In case of risk aversion
the measure is smaller 0.5. A risk seeking individual has a measure larger than 0.5 and a risk
neutral subject has a measure equal to 0.5.
Loss aversion relates the slope of utility in the gain domain to its slope in the loss domain.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) define loss aversion by −u(−x) > u(x) for every x > 0. We
measure the coefficient of loss aversion as the mean of −u(−x)/u(x) for all elicited values x.
Allais-type preferences are measured by metric measure of the common-ratio effect (CRE)
to assess the preference reversal due to violations of the independence axiom. Participants
exhibiting the common-ratio effect show a preference reversal such that, they have a preference
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for certain outcomes. Participants with a CRE of 0 are consistent with expected utility theory,
a CRE larger zero indicates Allais-type preferences and subjects with a CRE smaller zero have
reverse Allais-type preferences.
Subjects’ numeracy is rated according to a combination of the Schwartz et al. (1997) and
the Berlin Numercy Test that assess the understanding of fundamental concepts of probability.
Subjects have to answer seven questions and the variable numeracy reflects how many of these
questions were answered correctly.
Table 1: Summary statistics by treatment
Treatment No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS
First format FPSBA DA FPSBA DA FPSBA DA p-value
Risk aversion 0.461 0.466 0.499 0.528 0.441 0.526 0.52
(0.167) (0.105) (0.106) (0.140) (0.143) (0.103)
Loss aversion 1.842 1.396 1.673 1.352 2.088 1.407 0.08
(0.860) (0.474) (0.713) (0.506) (0.842) (0.450)
Allais-type 2 2.714 3.857 3.667 4.333 2.267 0.90
(13.90) (2.301) (4.605) (6.199) (9.566) (18.25)
Numeracy 4.333 4.714 3.929 4.833 4.167 4.867 0.24
(1.291) (2.199) (1.141) (1.267) (1.403) (0.990)
Participants 15 14 14 12 12 15
Notes: Reported are means of each variable with standard deviation in parentheses. The last
column presents the results of a Kruskal-Wallis tests for the equality of populations.
Organization
The auctions were the second stage of the experiment. In the first stage, which was conducted
one week before the second, participants’ preferences were elicited. Detailed results are reported
in Zeppenfeld (2015).10 Both stages of the experiment were conducted in the Cologne Labo-
ratory for Economic Research (CLER) at the University of Cologne, Germany.11 Using the
recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), we invited a random sample of the CLER’s subject
pool via email. The whole experiment was computerized using the programming environment
z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
In both stages, payoffs were stated in Euros (EUR). Participants were paid out in private
for the entire course of experimentation after the completion of the second stage. In the second
10The first stage of the experiment was the same for all participants and participants only learned
their earnings of the first part until the very end of the entire experiment, i.e., after they completed the
second stage.
11See www.lab.uni-koeln.de.
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stage, one auction of each auction format was randomly chosen to be payoff-relevant. All 82
participants were paid their total net earnings, i.e., their earnings from the auctions and their
earnings from first stage of the experiment. The average payoff for the entire experiment was
36.63 EUR corresponding to approx. 45.54 USD at the time of the payment.12
3.2 Opportunity costs and action sets
Previous research argues that differences between the two mechanisms come from the hetero-
geneous organization of the two auctions. The FPSBA is faster, as it only requires to place
simultaneous bids and the winner can be announced immediately after all bids are collected.
The DA, on the other hand, requires a certain time interval for the clock to reach the desired
price level of an individual bidder. Hence, a bidder in a DA faces substantial waiting costs.
Carare and Rothkopf (2005) analyze the effect of transaction costs that accrue from the neces-
sity to return to the auction site to check whether the desired price level has been reached. Not
surprisingly, facing these additional costs, a bidder is willing to stop the auction at a higher
price to avoid the need to return to the auction site.
Cox et al. (1983) and Katok and Kwasnica (2007) analyze the following trade-off experi-
mentally. Despite the fact that bidders face transaction and/or opportunity costs from slow
DA’s, they also enjoy the “waiting game”, as it implies a certain level of suspense. Cox et al.
(1983) do not find that tripling payoffs, and therewith increasing the opportunity costs of play-
ing the waiting game, significantly increases bids in a DA. Hence, they reject the hypothesis
of “suspense utility”. Katok and Kwasnica (2007) find that increasing the clock time, i.e., the
time between consecutive price ticks, significantly increases bids in a DA. Slow clocks increase
opportunity costs which have to be paid no matter if the bidder wins the auction or not. Katok
and Kwasnica (2007) note that in the laboratory, these opportunity costs correspond most likely
to participants’ value of leaving the laboratory earlier. Hence, a bidder is willing to accept a
higher ask to reduce the time to complete the experiment and save opportunity costs.
We account for opportunity costs in two ways. First, we hold opportunity costs constant
across treatments. We follow Turocy et al. (2007) and keep the time per mechanism constant.
This means that we fix the absolute time per mechanism irrespective of how fast participants
12The first stage elicited preference parameters across gains and losses. Total net payoffs across the
entire experiment range from −3.00 EUR (−3.73 USD) to 98.45 EUR (122.41 USD). The one subject
who accumulated negative payoffs paid in cash at the end of experiment.
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decide (FPSBA) or how early they stop (DA). One round of bidding in the FPSBA always
lasts 60 seconds.13 One round of bidding in the DA always lasts 220 seconds, i.e., ten seconds
per price tick (see below for a motivation). If a participant accepts a current ask, he wins
the auction, but the next round does not start before the 220 seconds are over.14 Second, all
subjects play both the FPSBA and the DA.
Katok and Kwasnica (2007) show that the clock speed has great impact on the bids in
a DA due to the implied differences in opportunity costs. Because we hold opportunity costs
constant, this is not an argument in our experiment. Participants in the FPSBA have 60 seconds
to arrive at a bid that balances the trade-off between the winning probability and the profit in
case of winning. We determine the clock speed in the DA based on two considerations. On the
one hand, the trade-off between two consecutive price ticks in a DA is easier to compute and
participants should need less time. On the other hand, we have to provide some time for the
reference point to form. We therefore decide on a clock speed of ten seconds. This is the same
clock speed as in the middle treatment in Katok and Kwasnica (2007). However, in contrast to
their experiment subjects cannot reduce the duration of the DA in our experiment, as each DA
lasts for 220 seconds.
In addition to controlling opportunity costs, we also hold action sets constant across the
two mechanisms. In Cox et al. (1983), participants’ bids are rounded to the next feasible bid in
the DA. Participants can then either confirm or alter this rounded bid. In Katok and Kwasnica
(2007), participants can bid integers in the FPSBA, whereas price decrements in the DA were
five tokens. In contrast, in our design, participants in the FPSBA face the same set of possible
prices as in the DA. This is a direct transfer of our model environment to the laboratory and
ensures strict comparability between the two mechanisms.
4 Results
In this section, we report the results of the second stage of our laboratory experiment and focus
on the comparison of the FPSBA and the DA. We only consider winning bids, because we
only observe a participant’s bid in the DA if a participant stopped the auction and won. In
13If participants do not enter a valid bid by the end of this time limit, they do not participate in the
auction in that round.
14In both mechanisms, after the auction has ended, participants see a screen showing the remaining
time until the round is completed and whether or not they have won the auction.
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order to derive a one-dimensional measure of individual bidding behavior, we first conduct OLS
regressions without constants for each participant. Regressing without a constant corresponds
to the assumption that a bidder with a valuation of zero behaves rational and places a bid of
zero. This gives us the average slope of a subjects bidding function. The steeper the slope the
more aggressive is the subject’s bidding behavior. Each participant represents one independent
observation, because there was no interaction between participants. We report results of non-
parametric Wilcoxon signed rank (SR), Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW), or Kruskal-Wallis
(KW) tests.
In line with the observations by Coppinger et al. (1980) and Cox et al. (1982), we find that
individuals place higher bids in the FPSBA than in the DA (MWW: p = 0.0183). However, a
closer look reveals that bidders only place higher bids in the FPSBA than in the DA if they get
no decision support (MWW: p = 0.0046). The No DSS treatment is comparable to standard
experimental auction designs. If bidders get (some) decision support, the differences vanish
(MWW: Medium DSS p = 0.1498 and Full DSS p = 0.6256). Table A.2 complements these
tests controlling for bidder characteristics. It confirms the observation that bids in the DA are
substantially lower than in the FPSBA in absence of decision support (p < 0.001) and that this
differences vanish once support is provided (Medium DSS p = 0.1628, Full DSS p = 0.8044).
In the FPSBA, the provision of decision support changes the bidding behavior significantly
(KW: p = 0.0704). Bidders who receive decision support (Medium DSS, Full DSS) place lower
bids than bidders without decision support (No DSS; MWW: p = 0.0214). In contrast, the
influence of decision support is overall not significant in the DA (KW: p = 0.1224). However, we
find some evidence that the effect of decision support works in the opposite direction compared to
the FPSBA, i.e., bidders who only receive limited decision support (No DSS, Medium DSS) place
smaller bids than those bidders who get full decision support (Full DSS; MWW: p = 0.0424).
Figure 1 illustrates the bidding behavior and Table 2 presents the results of Tobit panel
regressions analyzing the influence of elicited preferences and of decision support in the FPSBA
and the DA. Controlling for individual characteristics, the regressions support the results of our
non-parametric tests. The provision of decision support (Medium DSS, Full DSS) decreases bids
in the FPSBA. In contrast to that, in the DA the provision of Medium DSS does not influence
bidding behavior (p = 0.679) and the influence of Full DSS is also not significant (p = 0.106).
The regressions further show that risk-averse bidders place higher bids, which is in line with
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other experimental studies (See for example Bichler et al., 2015). Our measures of individual
loss aversion and Allais-type preferences have no or only marginal influence on bidding behavior.
Theories based on Allais-type preferences predict higher bids in the DA than in the FPSBA,
something we do not observe. In the DA we find some indication that subjects with a higher
numeracy score place lower bids. However, the significance vanishes if we do not control for risk
aversion.
Table A.1 complements Table 2 and examines if the elicited preferences (risk aversion,
loss aversion, Allais-tpye preferences) and characteristics (numeracy) have different effects on
bidding behavior in the two auction formats. We only find weak evidence that a higher numeracy
score leads ceteris paribus to lower bids in the DA than in the FPSBA, but no indication that
any of the elicited preferences can explain differences in bidding behavior. Cox et al. (1983)
argue that differences between the two mechanisms result from violations of Bayes’ rule and
indirectly test this conjecture by tripling individual payoffs which increases opportunity costs
from miscalculations. In contrast, our design is a direct test of the impact of cognitive limitations
and we find additional evidence for this conjecture.
Similar to the other experimental papers that compare bidding behavior in the FPSBA to
bidding behavior in the DA (Cox et al., 1983; Katok and Kwasnica, 2007), participants in our
experiment first played 18 rounds in the DA and then another 18 rounds in the FPSBA.15 In
contrast to the findings of Cox et al. (1983); Katok and Kwasnica (2007), we find that neither
subjects who first participate in the FPSBA nor subjects who start in the DA change their
bidding behavior when the auction format changes (SR: FPSBA → DA, p = 0.3888; DA →
FPSBA, p = 0.1973). This within-participant consistency is in contrast to the literature and
we relate this finding to the strict comparability of the two formats in our experiment. Hence,
our bidding data indicates that a constant action set and fixed opportunity costs are necessary
for consistency between the two formats.16 The other cited experiments that also vary the
order of the two formats do not find a similar consistency in bidding even in absence of decision
support. We think that the consistency in our data stems from the direct comparability of the
two formats in our design by using the same price grid and holding opportunity costs constant.
Only bidders in the No DSS treatment who start bidding in the FPSBA change their bidding
15In order to control for order effects, about half of the participants played in reverse order.
16Opportunity costs include, e.g., monitoring costs (Carare and Rothkopf, 2005) or costs from partic-
ipating in the experiment (Katok and Kwasnica, 2007).
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Notes: Depicted are medians of the winning bids for each valuation and format separated by
decision support. The reference line is the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) given by
Linear SP (L-SP). Participants in No DSS do not receive additional information. In treatment
Medium DSS, participants receive information about the winning probability (FPSBA) or the
probability to receive the next price (DA). In treatment Full DSS, participants receive the
same information as in Medium DSS and, in addition, the expected profit associated with
their bid.
Figure 1: Median winning bids across decision support.
behavior and place lower bids when the auction format changes to a DA (SR: p = 0.0995). This
observation might indicate that, in absence of decision support, the FPSBA is more complex
than the DA.
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Table 2: Tobit panel regressions of the influence of preferences on winning bids in periods
1 to 18.
Winning bid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FPSBA DA FPSBA DA
Valuation 0.523∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0154) (0.0134) (0.0154)
Allais-type -0.0222 0.00507 -0.0156 0.00747
(0.0374) (0.0289) (0.0347) (0.0275)
Risk aversion 6.101∗∗ 10.02∗∗∗ 6.202∗∗ 9.533∗∗∗
(2.974) (2.983) (2.754) (2.928)
Loss aversion 0.488 -0.468 0.441 -0.536
(0.508) (0.745) (0.475) (0.709)
Numeracy 0.200 -0.469∗∗ 0.115 -0.472∗∗
(0.300) (0.233) (0.280) (0.222)
midDSS -2.007∗∗ -0.329
(0.786) (0.795)
fullDSS -1.670∗∗ 1.218
(0.812) (0.753)
Period 0.0865∗∗∗ 0.0336 0.0859∗∗∗ 0.0338
(0.0237) (0.0267) (0.0237) (0.0267)
Constant -2.553 -0.00274 -1.005 0.00709
(2.652) (2.199) (2.520) (2.096)
Observations 443 448 443 448
Participants 41 41 41 41
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: Reported are results of tobit panel regressions with an upper limit at
the highest possible bid of 21.
5 Conclusion
We examine the role of decision support and preferences in first-price sealed-bid and Dutch
auctions. In a laboratory experiment, we elicit participants’ preferences and vary the degree
of decision support to account for the complexity in deriving the optimal bid. We confirm the
frequently observed non-equivalence of the first-price and Dutch auction under the absence of
decision support. In addition, we observe that any differences in bidding behavior between the
two mechanisms vanish once we provide decision support, which indicates that differences in
bidding behavior are due to different levels of complexity. Differences between the two auction
formats based on preferences should be independent of the level of decision support. We use
the elicited individual preferences of all participants to explain bidding behavior. We find no
19
indication that non-standard preferences explain the empirical differences. Our results thus
indicate that the empirical breakdown of equivalence is primarily caused by the complexity of
the bidding decision rather than by bidders’ preferences. This observation should be taken into
account in real-world business interactions involving auctions.
In the experiment, the implemented DSS is perfect in the sense that we can precisely cal-
culate the respective probabilities and expected values due to the fixed bidding strategy of a
bidding robot. Obviously, this is not directly implementable in real auctions. However, the
availability of historical bid data promotes the design of decision support systems similar to
our implementation. Thus, our findings on the differences in auction formats indicate that the
higher revenue in the FPSBA is less relevant in real auctions in which bidders are likely to have
such support.
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A Appendices
A.1 Tables
Table A.1: Tobit panel regression of the influence of preferences and numeracy on differ-
ences between winning bids in the FPBSA and the DA in periods 1 to 18.
Winning Bid
Valuation 0.501∗∗∗
(0.0103)
Period 0.0577∗∗∗
(0.0181)
Constant -1.730
(2.548)
Risk aversion 6.053∗∗
(2.873)
Loss aversion 0.490
(0.490)
Allais-type -0.0225
(0.0360)
Numeracy 0.216
(0.290)
DA 0.843
(3.358)
DA × Risk aversion 3.914
(4.217)
DA × Loss aversion -0.937
(0.913)
DA × Allais 0.0280
(0.0469)
DA × Numeracy -0.672∗
(0.377)
Observations 891
Participants 82
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: The upper limit in the Tobit regression is the maximum bid of 21. It
was placed in 174 out of 891 observations. DA is a dummy variable that is
zero if the auction format is a FPSBA and is one in case of a DA.
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Table A.2: Tobit panel regression of the influence of decision support in the FPSBA and
the DA in periods 1 to 18.
Winning bid
Valuation 0.502∗∗∗
(0.0103)
Period 0.0581∗∗∗
(0.0181)
Constant 1.417
(1.682)
Allais-type -0.00370
(0.0220)
Risk aversion 6.498∗∗∗
(1.973)
Loss aversion 0.169
(0.388)
Numeracy -0.159
(0.172)
midDSS -2.245∗∗∗
(0.786)
fullDSS -1.729∗∗
(0.815)
DA -3.251∗∗∗
(0.794)
DA × midDSS 2.088∗
(1.131)
DA × fullDSS 3.041∗∗∗
(1.130)
Observations 891
Participants 82
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Notes: The upper limit in the Tobit regression is the maximum bid of 21. It
was placed in 174 out of 891 observations. DA is a dummy variable that is
zero if the auction format is a FPSBA and is one in case of a DA.
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Table A.3: Average winning bids for periods 1 to 18.
No DSS Medium DSS Full DSS KW test
Valuation FPSBA DA p-value FPSBA DA p-value FPSBA DA p-value p-value p-value
FPSBA DA
6 4.25 7.42 0.8710 4.25 4.00 0.5541 4.25 3.67 0.4450 0.9905 0.9191
10 6.67 6.00 0.3417 7.31 5.93 0.1234 7.38 6.57 0.6310 0.5114 0.6148
14 10.20 8.35 0.0397 10.38 10.50 0.9575 8.67 8.55 0.7575 0.1396 0.1450
18 14.39 11.04 0.0042 12.57 10.91 0.1105 11.25 11.80 0.1498 0.2347 0.7103
22 15.29 12.05 0.0740 14.54 13.83 0.5108 14.67 13.42 0.2008 0.7910 0.6215
26 18.88 14.50 0.0022 15.18 15.71 0.6428 17.09 17.15 0.8142 0.0150 0.0878
30 19.71 16.14 0.0019 17.96 15.73 0.3084 18.00 18.20 0.786 0.0189 0.1328
34 20.20 17.65 0.0062 18.68 17.04 0.1268 18.83 19.17 0.6750 0.0219 0.1285
38 20.20 17.86 0.0190 19.35 18.42 0.4404 18.50 19.77 0.1287 0.0265 0.1372
Average 15.87 13.33 - 14.57 13.86 - 14.93 15.01 - - -
Notes: Reported are the average winning bids for periods 1 to 18 and the
probability that bids in the different formats are drawn from the same dis-
tribution based on the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U-test. The Kruskal-Wallis
(KW) test reports whether there is any significant difference across decision
support systems for a given auction format.
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A.2 Theory
We consider a situation in which the bidder faces one competitor either in a FPSBA or in a DA.
Let P = {p1, p2, · · · , pn} be the common price grid, i.e. the set of possible bids in the FPSBA
and the set of possible offers in the DA. Let pk denote the kth- smallest possible price in this
price grid. Let the price grid be uniformly spaced, with pk − pk−1 = δ for all k.
The probability that the competitor places a bid smaller or equal pk in the FPSBA is given
by F (pk). F (pk) also denotes the probability that the highest price offer the competitor is going
to accept in a DA is smaller or equal pk.
For large η and λ the utility of a bidder is mainly driven by the relative outcomes, i.e. by his
gain loss utility, and not by absolute outcomes. Consequently, it may be the case that a bidder
who has a strictly positive chance of making strictly positive profits and faces no risk of a loss
prefers not to participate in the auction. In the following we assume that bidder’s expected
utility is increasing in his valuation, which rules out such implausible predictions and guarantees
monotone bidding functions This assumption is referred to as no dominance of gain-loss utility
in Herweg et al. (2010).
A.2.1 First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
In the FPSBA both participants place a bid bi ∈ P and the participant who places the higher
bid wins. In case of a tie both participants have a winning probability of one half. The expected
profit of a bidder with valuation v bidding bk is given by
Π(bk, v) =
[
F (bk−1) +
F (bk)− F (bk−1)
2
]
· (v − bk) (A.1)
=
F (bk) + F (bk−1)
2
· (v − bk) (A.2)
=: P kω · (v − bk). (A.3)
When relative outcomes are evaluated as
µ(x) :=

ηx x ≥ 0
ηλx x < 0,
(A.4)
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the expected utility of a bidder with KR preferences bidding bk is given by
U(bk, v) = P
k
ω · (v − bk)
+P kω · (1− P kω ) · µ(v − bk) (A.5)
+P kω · (1− P kω ) · µ(bk − v)
and optimal bids are given by
b∗FP (v) = arg max
b∈P
{U(b, v)} . (A.6)
As the price grid starts at 0, bidders can always place bids smaller their valuation. For this
reason the relevant part of the piece-wise defined utility function is given by
U(bk, v) = P
k
ω · (v − bk)− P kω · (1− P kω ) · (v − bk) · η(λ− 1). (A.7)
Let vk be the valuation for which a bidder is indifferent between bidding pk and pk+1.
Given that these vk are increasing in k the optimal bidding strategy βFP (v) is monotone and
it is optimal for bidders to bid pk for all bidders with a valuation between vk−1 and vk. These
indifference values are given by
U(bk, vk)
!
= U(bk+1, vk) (A.8)
⇔ vk = bk + δ
:=Ωk+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
P k+1ω − P k+1ω (1− P k+1ω )η(λ− 1)
P k+1ω − P kω − η(λ− 1)
(
P k+1ω (1− P k+1ω )− P kω (1− P kω )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Λk=Ωk+1−Ωk
(A.9)
The no dominance of gain-loss utility assumption implies a restriction on values for η and
λ:
∂U(b, v)
∂v
= P kω − P kω · (1− P kω )η(λ− 1)
!≥ 0
⇔ η(λ− 1) !≤ min
k∈{1,...,n}
{
1
1− P kω
}
⇔ η(λ− 1) !≤ 1
1− P 1ω
, (A.10)
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(A.10) implies that Ωk ≥ 0 and Λk ≥ 0 for all k and we get
vk − vk−1 =
=δ︷ ︸︸ ︷
bk − bk−1 +δ
[
Ωk+1
Λk
− Ωk
Λk−1
]
=
δ
ΛkΛk−1
[ΛkΛk−1 + ΩkΛk − Ωk+1Λk−1]
=
δ
ΛkΛk−1
[Λk−1(λk − Ωk+1) + ΩkΛk]
=
δΩk
ΛkΛk−1
[Λk − Λk−1] > 0.
The bidding strategy is then given by
βFP (v) =

0 if v ∈ [0, v1]
bk if v ∈ (vk, vk+1],
(A.11)
with vn+1 = 1 if vk ≤ 1. Else if vk > 1 for any k, βFP is adjusted accordingly.
A.2.2 Dutch Auction
In the DA participants sequentially receive decreasing offers aj ∈ P starting with pn. A par-
ticipant who receives an offer can either accept or reject it. In case of acceptance the auction
ends immediately. If the participant who receives the offer pk first rejects, the other participant
will also receive the offer pk. If the other participant rejects pk, too, the new offer will be pk−1.
Which participant receives the offer pk−1 first is randomly determined. This modeling approach
is also used by Bose and Daripa (2009).
Every time the bidder receives an offer he has the choice between accepting or waiting for
a lower offer. Let Hk be the probability that the bidder will receive an offer pk−1 given that he
rejects offer pk. The probability Hk can be split in two parts. First, ρk denotes the probability
that the price step pk−1 is reached, i.e. the probability that the good is not sold at pk. Second,
φk denotes the probability that the bidder receives an offer pk−1 given that the price step pk−1
is reached. Consequently, Hk = ρk · φk.
Computation of ρk In order to derive the probability ρk of reaching the next price step
pk−1 we first determine how likely it is that the bidder receives the first offer at pk given that he
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receives an offer pk. First, denote by #
i
k ∈ {1, 2} the position of the bidder in period k. Second,
denote by Ak the event that the bidder receives the offer pk.
Pr{#k = 1|Ak} = Pr{#k = 1} · Pr{Ak|#k = 1}
Pr{#k = 1} · Pr{Ak|#k = 1}+ Pr{#k = 2} · Pr{Ak|#k = 2} (A.12)
=
1
2
1
2 +
1
2 · F (pk)F (pk+1)
(A.13)
=
F (pk+1)
F (pk+1) + F (pk)
. (A.14)
Consequently, the probability that the bidder is asked second at pk given that he is asked at pk
is given by
Pr{#k = 2|Ak} =1− Pr{#k = 1|Ak} (A.15)
=
F (pk)
F (pk+1) + F (pk)
. (A.16)
Given that the bidder is asked second, #k = 2|Ak, his rejection of the offer pk directly implies
that the price step pk−1 is reached. However, if the bidder is asked first, #k = 1|Ak, his rejection
only implies that the price step pk−1 is reached if the competitor also rejects pk given that she
already rejected pk+1, which happens with probability F (pk)/F (pk+1). Hence, the probability
ρk that price step pk−1 will be reached given that the bidder rejects the offer pk is given by
ρk = Pr{#k = 2|Ak} · 1 + Pr{#k = 1|Ak} · F (pk)
F (pk+1)
(A.17)
=
2 · F (pk)
F (pk+1) + F (pk)
. (A.18)
Computation of φk Given that the price step pk−1 is reached the probability of being asked
first is one half. In this case the bidder receives an offer with certainty. If the opponent is asked
first, which also happens with a probability of one half, the bidder receives the item only if the
competitor refuses the offer pk−1. The probability that the competitor refuses the offer pk−1
given that she refused pk is given by F (pk−1)/F (pk). Hence, the probability of receiving an
offer pk−1 given that price step pk−1 is reached is given by
φk =
1
2
+
1
2
· F (pk−1)
F (pk)
. (A.19)
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Computation of Hk Combining the probability ρk of reaching the next price step pk−1
with the probability φk of receiving an offer given that the price step pk−1 is reached, gives us
the probability Hk of receiving another offer when rejecting pk.
Hk =ρk · φk (A.20)
=
F (pk) + F (pk−1)
F (pk) + F (pk+1)
. (A.21)
Bidding Let R (pj |pk) denote the probability that the bidder will be receive (or has received)
an offer pj given that he is currently offered pk,
R (pj |pk) :=

F (pj)+F (pj+1)
F (pk)+F (pk+1)
j ≤ k
1 j > k.
(A.22)
Note that for some a < b < c,
R (a|b) R (b|c) = R (a|c) .
The expected profit of a bidder with valuation v planning to accept offer pj who is currently
offered pk ≥ pj is given by
Π(pj , v|pk) = R (pj |pk) · (v − pj). (A.23)
A bidder with KR preferences conceives a plan at the beginning of the auction, namely accepting
the offer r ∈ {p1, ..., pm} and evaluates his profit compared to a reference outcome determined
by his plan. The utility of such a bidder with valuation v who planned to accept offer r from
accepting the current offer pk is given by
uk = v − pk + (1− R (r|pk)) · µ (v − pk) + R (r|pk) · µ (r − pk) . (A.24)
Defining
u(x, r|y) = v − x+ (1− R (r|y)) · µ (v − x) + R (r|y) · µ (r − x) , (A.25)
We now analyze two cases:
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1. pj < r < pk:
Then, the expected utility from waiting for an offer pj is given by,
U(pj , v, r|pk) = R(r|pk)
[
(1− R(pj |r))[µ(r − v)] +R(pj |r) [v − pj + µ(r − pj)]
]
. (A.26)
2. r < pj < pk:
Then, the expected utility from waiting for an offer pj is given by,
U(pj , v, r|pk) = R(pj |pk)
[
(1− R(r|pj))[v − pj + µ(v − pj)] +R(r|pj) [v − pj + µ(r − pj)]
]
.
(A.27)
The bidder prefers to accept now over waiting if and only if
uk,r ≥ max
pj<pk
{U(pj , v, r|pk)} (A.28)
Determining the indifference values vk,r gives us the bidding function,
βr(v) =

0 if v ∈ [0, v1]
pk if v ∈ (vk, vk+1],
(A.29)
with vm+1 = 1.
These strategies define best responses to the distribution of competitor’s bids F (x). It is
easy to see that bidding strategies depend on the reference point r, i.e. the bidders plan when
to accept an offer. As a consequence multiple personal equilibria are possible.
A.2.3 First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction vs. Dutch Auction
For subjects with KR preferences it is not possible to make a general statement about the
revenue ranking of the FPSBA and the Dutch auction. In the following we provide examples
that prove this statement.
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Figure A.1: Equilibrium bids in Dutch auctions and FPSBA
Minimum PEs
Maximum PEs
FPSBA
v
bids
1
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
Notes: This figure shows the lowest and the highest personal equilibrium bids in the DA and the unique
equilibrium bidding strategy in the FPSBA for λ = 2.5 and η = 0.5. The revenue ranking of the two
auction format depends on the equilibrium selection in the DA.
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A.3 Instructions
This section provides the instruction in German (original) and English (translated) separated
by parts 1 and 2. Each part consists of part A and part B. Part B was always distributed after
part A had been conducted. Experiment 1 was identical for each participant. Experiment 2
was counterbalanced, i.e., half of the participants received the first-price sealed-bid auction in
part A followed by the Dutch auction in part B. The other half faced the reversed order. We
present the instructions for the full-DSS treatment where subjects had full information. The
instructions for the other treatments are the same and only exclude parts of the decision support
which is reported in parentheses within the instructions.
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   1	  
Übersicht	  	  
Dieser	  Teil	  des	  Experiments	  besteht	  aus	  18	  Runden,	  die	   jeweils	  die	  gleiche	  Abfolge	  an	  Entscheidungen	  
haben.	  Am	  Ende	  wird	  eine	  der	  18	  Runden	  zufällig	  durch	  den	  Computer	  ausgewählt	  und	  ausgezahlt.	  Alle	  
Runden	  haben	  dabei	  die	  gleiche	  Wahrscheinlichkeit	  ausgewählt	  zu	  werden.	  	  
	  
Erstpreisauktion	  
Sie	   nehmen	   an	   einer	   Erstpreisauktion	   teil,	   in	   der	   Sie	   ein	   Produkt	   erwerben	   können.	   Zu	   Beginn	   jeder	  
Runde	  erfahren	  Sie,	  welchen	  Wert	  das	  Produkt	  für	  Sie	  hat.	  Dieser	  Wert	  wird	  aus	  der	  Menge	  	  	  
{	  6	  €,	  10	  €,	  14	  €,	  18	  €,	  22	  €,	  26	  €,	  30	  €,	  34	  €,	  38	  €	  }	  
gezogen.	  Jeder	  Wert	  kommt	  genau	  zweimal	  vor.	  Die	  Reihenfolge	  ist	  jedoch	  zufällig	  bestimmt.	  
Sie	  befinden	  sich	  in	  einer	  Gruppe	  mit	  einem	  anderen	  Bieter.	  Der	  andere	  Bieter	  ist	  ein	  Bietroboter.	  	  
In	  der	  Auktion	  kann	  ein	  ganzzahliges	  Gebot	  zwischen	  0	  €	  und	  21	  €	  abgegeben	  werden.	  Der	  andere	  Bieter	  
wählt	  sein	  Gebot	  zufällig	  zwischen	  0	  €	  und	  21	  €.	  Jedes	  Gebot	  ist	  dabei	  gleich	  wahrscheinlich.	  
Der	  Bieter,	  der	  das	  höchste	  Gebot	  abgegeben	  hat,	  gewinnt	  die	  Auktion	  und	  erhält	  das	  Produkt.	  Der	  Preis	  
des	   Produkts	   entspricht	   diesem	   höchsten	   Gebot.	   Falls	   Sie	   und	   der	   andere	   Bieter	   das	   gleiche	   Gebot	  
abgeben,	  erhalten	  Sie	  das	  Produkt	  mit	  50%	  Wahrscheinlichkeit.	  
Falls	  Sie	  die	  Auktion	  gewinnen,	  ist	  Ihr	  Gewinn	  gegeben	  durch:	  
Gewinn	  =	  Wert	  –	  Gebot.	  
Falls	  Sie	  die	  Auktion	  nicht	  gewinnen,	  	  beträgt	  Ihr	  Gewinn	  0.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	   2	  
Entscheidungshilfe	  
Bevor	   Sie	   Ihr	   echtes	   Gebot	   eingeben,	   können	   Sie	   verschiedene	   Gebote	   testen,	   wofür	   Ihnen	   ein	  
Testbereich	  zur	  Verfügung	  steht.	  	  
Im	  Testbereich	  sehen	  Sie:	  
[Treatments:	  No	  DSS,	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Gewinn,	  falls	  Gebot	  erfolgreich	  
Der	  Gewinn,	  falls	  das	  aktuelle	  Testgebot	  erfolgreich	  wäre.	  Dieser	  wird	  wie	  folgt	  berechnet:	  
Gewinn	  =	  Wert	  –	  Gebot.	  
[Treatments:	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeit	  	  
Die	   Wahrscheinlichkeit,	   dass	   Sie	   mit	   einem	   Gebot	   in	   Höhe	   des	   Testgebots	   die	   Auktion	  
gewinnen.	  	  
[Treatments:	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Erwarteter	  Gewinn	  
Durchschnittlicher	   Gewinn,	   den	   Sie	   mit	   dem	   Gebot	   erwarten	   können.	   Dieser	   wird	   wie	   folgt	  
berechnet:	  
Erwarteter	  Gewinn	  =	  (Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeit)	  x	  (Gewinn,	  falls	  Gebot	  erfolgreich).	  
	  
Gebotsabgabe	  	  
• Um	  Ihr	   finales	  Gebot	  abzugeben,	   tippen	  Sie	  eine	  Zahl	  aus	  der	  erlaubten	  Menge	  der	  Gebote	   in	  
das	  vorgesehene	  Feld	  ein.	  Anschließend	  klicken	  Sie	  auf	  „Gebot	  abgeben“.	  
• Sie	  haben	  in	  jeder	  Runde	  60	  Sekunden	  Zeit,	  Ihr	  finales	  Gebot	  abzugeben.	  Sollten	  Sie	  kein	  Gebot	  
in	  den	  60	  Sekunden	  abgeben	  haben,	  nehmen	  Sie	  in	  dieser	  Runde	  nicht	  an	  der	  Auktion	  teil.	  
	  
Hinweis	  
Eine	   Runde	   dauert	   immer	   60	   Sekunden,	   unabhängig	   davon	   zu	   welchem	   Zeitpunkt	   Sie	   Ihr	   Gebot	  
abgegeben	   haben.	   Nachdem	   Sie	   und	   der	   andere	   Bieter	   ein	   finales	   Gebot	   abgegeben	   haben,	   ist	   die	  
Auktion	  zwar	  beendet,	  aber	  die	  Runde	  endet	  erst,	  wenn	  die	  60	  Sekunden	  abgelaufen	  sind.	  
	  
Ergebnis	  
	   1	  
Übersicht	  	  
Dieser	  Teil	  des	  Experiments	  besteht	  aus	  18	  Runden,	  die	   jeweils	  die	  gleiche	  Abfolge	  an	  Entscheidungen	  
haben.	  Am	  Ende	  wird	  eine	  der	  18	  Runden	  zufällig	  durch	  den	  Computer	  ausgewählt	  und	  ausgezahlt.	  Alle	  
Runden	  haben	  dabei	  die	  gleiche	  Wahrscheinlichkeit	  ausgewählt	  zu	  werden.	  	  
	  
Tickerauktion	  
Sie	  nehmen	  an	  einer	  Tickerauktion	  teil,	  in	  der	  Sie	  ein	  Produkt	  erwerben	  können.	  Zu	  Beginn	  jeder	  Runde	  
erfahren	  Sie,	  welchen	  Wert	  das	  Produkt	  für	  Sie	  hat.	  Dieser	  Wert	  wird	  aus	  der	  Menge	  	  	  
{	  6	  €,	  10	  €,	  14	  €,	  18	  €,	  22	  €,	  26	  €,	  30	  €,	  34	  €,	  38	  €	  }	  
gezogen.	  Jeder	  Wert	  kommt	  genau	  zweimal	  vor.	  Die	  Reihenfolge	  ist	  jedoch	  zufällig	  bestimmt.	  
Sie	  befinden	  sich	  in	  einer	  Gruppe	  mit	  einem	  anderen	  Bieter.	  Der	  andere	  Bieter	  ist	  ein	  Bietroboter.	  	  
In	  der	  Auktion	  startet	  der	  Preis	  bei	  21	  €	  und	  wird	  alle	  10	  Sekunden	  um	  1	  €	  gesenkt.	  Bei	   jedem	  neuen	  
Preis	   wird	   zufällig	   einer	   der	   Bieter	   zuerst	   gefragt,	   ob	   er	   diesen	   Preis	   annehmen	  möchte.	   Nimmt	   der	  
gefragte	   Bieter	   den	   Preis	   an,	   so	   endet	   damit	   die	   Auktion.	   Lehnt	   der	   gefragte	   Bieter	   ab,	   so	   wird	   der	  
gleiche	  Preis	  dem	  verbleibenden	  Bieter	   angeboten.	  Beide	  Bieter	  haben	  die	   gleiche	  Wahrscheinlichkeit	  
zuerst	  gefragt	  zu	  werden.	  	  
Der	  andere	  Bieter	  wählt	   zufällig	  einen	  Preis	   zwischen	  0	  €	  und	  21	  €	  aus,	   zu	  dem	  er	  annehmen	  würde.	  
Jeder	  mögliche	  Preis	  hat	  dabei	  die	  gleiche	  Wahrscheinlichkeit	  ausgewählt	  zu	  werden.	  
Sie	   gewinnen	   die	   Auktion	   und	   erhalten	   das	   Produkt,	   falls	   Sie	   vor	   dem	   anderen	   Bieter	   einen	   Preis	  
annehmen.	  	  
Falls	  Sie	  die	  Auktion	  gewinnen,	  ist	  Ihr	  Gewinn	  gegeben	  durch:	  
Gewinn	  =	  Wert	  –	  Preis.	  
Falls	  Sie	  die	  Auktion	  nicht	  gewinnen,	  	  beträgt	  Ihr	  Gewinn	  0.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	   2	  
Entscheidungshilfe	  
Sie	  sehen	  auf	  dem	  Bildschirm	  den	  aktuellen	  Preis,	  den	  nächsten	  Preis	  sowie	  die	  Zeit	  bis	  zum	  nächsten	  
Preis.	  	  
Zusätzlich	  sehen	  Sie:	  
[Treatments:	  No	  DSS,	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Gewinn	  bei	  gegebenem	  Preis	  
Der	  Gewinn,	  falls	  Sie	  den	  Preis	  annehmen	  würden.	  Dieser	  wird	  wie	  folgt	  berechnet:	  
Gewinn	  bei	  gegebenem	  Preis	  	  =	  Wert	  –	  Preis.	  
[Treatments:	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Wahrscheinlichkeit,	  Preis	  angeboten	  zu	  bekommen	  
Die	  Wahrscheinlichkeit,	  dass	  Sie	  den	  jeweiligen	  Preis	  annehmen	  können.	  
[Treatments:	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Erwarteter	  Gewinn	  
Durchschnittlicher	   Gewinn,	   den	   Sie	   erwarten	   können,	   wenn	   Sie	   sich	   jetzt	   entscheiden	   den	  
jeweiligen	  Preis	  anzunehmen.	  Dieser	  wird	  wie	  folgt	  berechnet:	  
Erwarteter	   Gewinn	   =	   (Wahrscheinlichkeit,	   Preis	   angeboten	   zu	   bekommen)	   x	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Gewinn,	  bei	  gegebenem	  Preis).	  
	  
Hinweis	  
Eine	  Runde	  dauert	  immer	  220	  Sekunden,	  unabhängig	  davon	  welchen	  Preis	  Sie	  annehmen.	  Nachdem	  Sie	  
oder	  der	  andere	  Bieter	  einen	  Preis	  angenommen	  haben,	   ist	  die	  Auktion	  zwar	  beendet,	  aber	  die	  Runde	  
endet	  erst,	  wenn	  die	  220	  Sekunden	  abgelaufen	  sind.	  
	  
Ergebnis	  
Nach	   jeder	   Runde	   sehen	   Sie	   das	   Ergebnis	   der	   Runde.	  Hier	   erfahren	   Sie	   den	  Preis,	   ob	   Sie	   das	   Produkt	  
erhalten	  haben	  und	  wie	  hoch	  Ihr	  Gewinn	  ist.	  	  
	   1	  
Overview	  
This	  part	  of	  the	  experiment	  consists	  of	  18	  rounds	  which	  have	  the	  same	  course	  of	  decisions.	  At	  the	  end,	  
one	  of	  the	  18	  rounds	  will	  be	  randomly	  selected	  by	  the	  computer	  and	  paid	  out.	  All	  rounds	  have	  the	  same	  
probability	  to	  be	  selected.	  	  
	  
First-­‐Price	  Auction	  
You	  will	  participate	  in	  a	  first-­‐price	  auction	  in	  which	  you	  can	  acquire	  a	  product.	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  
round,	  you	  will	  learn	  which	  value	  this	  product	  has	  for	  you.	  The	  value	  will	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  set	  	  
{6	  €,	  10	  €,	  14	  €,	  18	  €,	  22	  €,	  26	  €,	  30	  €,	  34	  €,	  38	  €}.	  
Each	  value	  occurs	  exactly	  twice.	  The	  order,	  however,	  is	  random.	  
You	  are	  in	  a	  group	  with	  one	  other	  bidder.	  This	  other	  bidder	  is	  a	  bidding	  robot.	  
In	  the	  auction,	  you	  can	  enter	  an	  integer	  bid	  between	  0	  €	  and	  21	  €.	  The	  other	  bidder	  will	  choose	  his	  bid	  
randomly	  between	  0	  €	  and	  21	  €.	  Every	  bid	  is	  equally	  likely.	  
The	  bidder	  with	  the	  highest	  bid	  wins	  the	  auction	  and	  receives	  the	  product.	  The	  price	  of	  the	  product	   is	  
given	  by	  this	  highest	  bid.	   If	  you	  and	  the	  other	  bidder	  submit	  the	  same	  bid,	  you	  have	  a	  50%	  chance	  to	  	  
receive	  the	  product.	  
If	  you	  win	  the	  auction,	  your	  profit	  is	  given	  by:	  
	   Profit	  =	  Value	  –	  Bid.	  
If	  you	  do	  not	  win	  the	  auction,	  your	  profit	  is	  0.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	   2	  
Decision	  Support	  
Before	  you	  enter	  your	  actual	  bid,	  you	  can	  test	  different	  bids	  for	  which	  a	  testing	  area	  is	  provided	  for	  you.	  
In	  the	  testing	  area,	  you	  will	  see:	  
[Treatments:	  No	  DSS,	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Profit	  if	  bid	  was	  successful	  
The	  profit	  if	  the	  actual	  profit	  was	  successful.	  It	  is	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  
Profit	  =	  Value	  –	  Bid.	  
[Treatments:	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Winning	  Probability	  
The	  probability	  that	  you	  win	  the	  auction	  with	  a	  bid	  equal	  to	  the	  test	  bid.	  
[Treatments:	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Expected	  Profit	  
Average	  profit	  that	  you	  can	  expect	  with	  the	  bid.	  It	  is	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  
Expected	  Profit	  =	  (Winning	  Probability)	  x	  (Profit	  if	  bid	  is	  successful).	  
	  
Bid	  Submission	  	  
• To	  submit	  your	  final	  bid,	  type	  in	  a	  number	  out	  of	  the	  feasible	  set	  of	  bids	  into	  the	  respective	  field.	  
Then,	  click	  on	  “submit	  bid”.	  
• In	  each	  round,	  you	  have	  60	  seconds	  to	  submit	  your	  final	  bid.	  If	  you	  do	  not	  submit	  a	  bid	  within	  
these	  60	  seconds,	  you	  will	  not	  participate	  in	  the	  auction	  in	  this	  round.	  
	  
Note	  
One	  round	  always	  lasts	  for	  60	  seconds,	  independently	  of	  when	  you	  submit	  your	  bid.	  After	  you	  and	  the	  
other	  bidder	  submitted	  a	  final	  bid,	  the	  auction	  end	  but	  the	  round	  will	  only	  end	  after	  the	  60	  seconds	  have	  
elapsed.	  
Result	  
After	  each	   round,	  you	  will	   see	   the	   result	  of	   that	   round.	  Here	  you	   learn	   the	  price,	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  
received	  the	  product,	  and	  how	  large	  your	  profit	  is.	  
	  
	  	  
	   1	  
Overview	  
This	  part	  of	  the	  experiment	  consists	  of	  18	  rounds	  which	  have	  the	  same	  course	  of	  decisions.	  At	  the	  end,	  
one	  of	  the	  18	  rounds	  will	  be	  randomly	  selected	  by	  the	  computer	  and	  paid	  out.	  All	  rounds	  have	  the	  same	  
probability	  to	  be	  selected.	  	  
	  
Ticker	  Auction	  
You	  will	   participate	   in	   a	   ticker	   auction	   in	  which	   you	   can	   acquire	   a	   product.	   At	   the	   beginning	   of	   each	  
round,	  you	  will	  learn	  which	  value	  this	  product	  has	  for	  you.	  The	  value	  will	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  set	  	  
{6	  €,	  10	  €,	  14	  €,	  18	  €,	  22	  €,	  26	  €,	  30	  €,	  34	  €,	  38	  €}.	  
Each	  value	  occurs	  exactly	  twice.	  The	  order,	  however,	  is	  random.	  
You	  are	  in	  a	  group	  with	  one	  other	  bidder.	  This	  other	  bidder	  is	  a	  bidding	  robot.	  
In	  the	  auction,	  the	  price	  starts	  at	  21	  €	  and	  will	  decrease	  by	  1	  €	  every	  10	  seconds.	  At	  every	  new	  price,	  one	  
of	  the	  bidders	  is	  randomly	  asked	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  wants	  to	  accept	  the	  price.	  If	  the	  bidder	  accepts	  the	  
price,	  the	  auction	  ends.	  If	  the	  bidder	  rejects	  the	  price,	  the	  same	  price	  is	  offered	  to	  the	  remaining	  bidder.	  
Both	  bidders	  have	  the	  same	  probability	  to	  be	  asked	  first.	  
The	  other	  bidder	  will	   randomly	  choose	  a	  price	  a	  price	  between	  0	   	  €	  and	  21	  €	  which	  he	  would	  accept.	  
Each	  feasible	  price	  has	  the	  same	  probability	  to	  be	  chosen.	  
You	  will	  win	  the	  auction	  and	  receive	  the	  product	  if	  you	  accept	  a	  price	  before	  the	  other	  bidder	  does.	  
If	  you	  win	  the	  auction,	  your	  profit	  is	  given	  by:	  
	   Profit	  =	  Value	  –	  Bid.	  
If	  you	  do	  not	  win	  the	  auction,	  your	  profit	  is	  0.	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	   2	  
Decision	  Support	  
On	  your	  screen,	  you	  see	  the	  current	  price,	  the	  next	  price,	  and	  the	  time	  until	  the	  next	  price	  is	  shown.	  
In	  addition,	  you	  will	  see:	  
[Treatments:	  No	  DSS,	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Profit	  at	  given	  price	  
The	  profit	  if	  you	  accepted	  the	  current	  price.	  It	  is	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  
Profit	  at	  given	  price	  =	  Value	  –	  price.	  
[Treatments:	  Medium	  DSS,	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Probability	  to	  be	  offered	  the	  given	  price	  
The	  probability	  that	  you	  can	  accept	  the	  respective	  price.	  	  
[Treatments:	  Full	  DSS]	  
• Expected	  Profit	  
Average	   profit	   that	   you	   can	   expect	   if	   you	   decide	   now	   to	   accept	   the	   respective	   price.	   It	   is	  
calculated	  as	  follows:	  
Expected	  Profit	  =	  (Probability	  to	  be	  offered	  this	  price)	  x	  (Profit	  at	  given	  price).	  
	  
Note	  
One	  round	  always	   lasts	  220	  seconds,	   independently	  of	  which	  price	  you	  accept.	  After	  you	  or	   the	  other	  
bidder	   accepted	   a	   price,	   the	   auction	   ends	   but	   the	   round	   will	   only	   end	   after	   the	   220	   seconds	   have	  
elapsed.	  
	  
Result	  
After	  each	   round,	  you	  will	   see	   the	   result	  of	   that	   round.	  Here	  you	   learn	   the	  price,	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  
received	  the	  product,	  and	  how	  large	  your	  profit	  is.	  
	  
A.4 Screens in the lab experiment
Notes: Depicted is the computer interface used in the first-price sealed-bid
auction. The individual valuation is depicted at the very top. Participants have
a test button Test-Gebot (Test bid) that allows to enter a bid. Depending on
the decision support, the following information is calculated from the test bid:
Profit falls Test-Gebot erfolgreich (Profit if bid was successful) (No, Medium,
and Full DSS), Gewinnwahrscheinlichkeit (Winning probability) (Medium and
Full DSS), and Erwarteter Profit (Expected profit) (Full DSS). A timer displays
the remaining time to submit a real bid that can be entered in the text field
in the lower right corner and submitted by pressing the button Gebot abgeben
(Submit bid).
Figure A.2: Computer Interface: FPSBA.
44
Notes: Depicted is the computer interface used in the Dutch auction. The
individual valuation is depicted at the very top. The screen shows the cur-
rent price, the time until the next price, and the next price. Depending on
the decision support, the following information is calculated automatically:
Gewinn bei gegebenem Preis (Profit at given price) (No, Medium, and Full
DSS), Wahrscheinlichkeit, Preis angeboten zu bekommen (Probability to be of-
fered the given price) (Medium and Full DSS), and Erwarteter Gewinn (Ex-
pected profit) (Full DSS). The current price can be accepted by pressing the
button Preis annehmen (Accept price).
Figure A.3: Computer Interface: DA.
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